The fundamental relation between a program P and its speci cation S is correctness: P satis es S if and only if P is correct with respect to S. In logic programming, this relationship can be particularly close, since logic can be used to express both speci cations and programs. Indeed logic programs are often regarded and used as (executable) speci cations themselves. In this paper, we argue that the relation between S and P should be rmly set in the context of the underlying problem domain, which we call a framework F, and we give a model-theoretic view of the correctness relation between speci cations and programs in F. We show that the correctness relation between S and P is always well-de ned. It thus provides a basis for properly distinguishing between S and P . We use the subset example throughout, to illustrate our model-theoretic approach.
Introduction
The fundamental relation between a logic program P and its speci cation S is correctness: P satis es S if and only if P is correct with respect to S. The precise nature of this relation depends on the chosen speci cation language L S (and the notion of correctness that has been adopted). For instance, if L S is also a logic language, then this relation could be very close (see e.g . 7] ). Indeed logic programs are often regarded and used as (executable) speci cations themselves. After all, a logic program is a Horn clause theory ( 6] ), and as such it can double as a de nition. This would seem to suggest that L S could be just Horn clause logic, and the notion of correctness is redundant.
In this paper, we argue that the relation between S and P should be set rmly in the context of the underlying problem domain, which we shall call the framework F. We will show that in F the relation between S and P is always well-de ned, and the notion of correctness is never redundant.
A framework F may be de ned either formally or informally, but it should provide an unambiguous underpinning of the semantics of any given S and P, as well as the semantics of P's correctness with respect to S. The correctness relation between S and P then allows us to distinguish between them. Basically, we say that there is a distinction between S and P only if the meaning of P is contained in, but does not coincide completely with, the meaning of S. That is, if P is only correct with respect to S, then a distinction exists between the two.
We will show that this approach makes sense not only for informal and formal frameworks (Sections 2 and 3 respectively), but also for open, or parameterised frameworks (Section 4). Throughout the paper, we will use the subset relation as an illustration. In order to be brief and to avoid complex notational and theoretical details, we will give an informal presentation. 2 Informal Correctness When a logic program P is used as an executable speci cation, then the framework F is only implicitly stated, i.e. informally de ned. Nevertheless the intended meaning of P can be regarded as an informal speci cation S of P. More importantly, S has to be interpreted in F, since it would normally refer to the abstract data types (inter alia) of F. That is, S is only meaningful in the context of F.
In this case, a discrepancy often arises between S and the actual meaning of P. For example, the purpose of using P as an executable speci cation (e.g. in rapid prototyping) is usually to verify its actual meaning against S by executing P. Clearly, this exercise is predicated on a potential di erence between S and P.
In this section, we illustrate the distinction between S and P in an informal framework, by considering several Prolog programs for subset together with their intended meanings. A=1,B=1; A=1,B=2; A=1,B=3;  A=2,B=1; A=2,B=2; A=2,B=3;  A=3,B=1; A=3,B=2; A=3,B=3. representing the 1-element subsets f1g, f2g, f3g, and the 2-element subsets f1,2g, f1,3g, f2,3g. Thus it is not possible to distinguish between P1 and S1. 1 That is Prolog without extension to support sets. 2 We will paraphrase O'Keefe's informal speci cations slightly for uniformity, whilst (hopefully) retaining their original meaning.
O'Keefe's second Prolog program P2 represents sets by unordered lists with no duplicates: select(X, X|R], R). select(X, H|T], H|R]) :-select(X, T, R).
subset( ], _). subset( X|Xs], Set) :-select(X, Set, Set1), subset(Xs, Set1).
(P2)
The (paraphrased) informal speci cation S2 of P2 given by O'Keefe is the following: \subset(Small, Large) is to be true if: Large is a list containing the elements of a set in no particular order, there being no duplicates; Small is a list containing the elements of a set in no particular order, there being no duplicates; the set Small represents is a subset of the set that Large represents."
Note that unlike S1, now S2 contains a pre-condition on Small and Large, viz. that they do not contain duplicates.
It is easy to see that P2 is a correct implementation of S2, i.e. whenever the pre-condition in S2 is satis ed, the meaning of P2 coincides completely with that of S2. For example the query Q1 has all the six expected answers: A=1,B=2; A=1,B=3; A=2,B=1; A=2,B=3; A=3,B=1; A=3,B=2.
However, whenever the pre-condition in S2 is not satis ed, P2 does not coincide with S2. Indeed P2 will happily accept Large with duplicates and produce Small When the framework F is de ned formally, we can formally de ne the semantics of a speci cation S, and its correctness relation with a program P in terms of either proof theory or model theory. In this section, we shall consider the model-theoretic correctness relation between S and P, following our approach to deductive synthesis of (both standard and constraint) logic programs (see e.g. 9, 11]), and illustrate it for the subset example.
We shall de ne F to be a full rst-order logical theory, S a rst-order formula in F that de nes a relation r, 6 and P a Horn theory whose language contains the relation r. Both F and P have intended models: the intended model of F is its isoinitial model I, while that of P is its minimum Herbrand model H. We say P is correct with respect to S in F i H and I are isomorphic when they are restricted to the relations r de ned by S. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . 7 The new symbol r de ned in S has an interpretation in I, and one in H. Correctness means that the two interpretations of r coincide (or, at least, are isomorphic). 3.1 Frameworks A framework is an axiomatisation of a problem domain. It has (i) a (manysorted) signature of sort symbols, function symbols, 8 and relation symbols; and (ii) a set of rst-order axioms for the function and relation symbols. gers, which is the standard theory of lists (of integers) with the usual list operations, in particular the`list membership' relation mem. Int stands for the standard (pre-de ned) integer type. Set is constructed by the constructor f g. 2 is the usual`set membership' relation. The rst axiom de nes 2 in terms of mem, while the second de nes set equality in terms of 2.
In general, a framework F typically de nes a new abstract data type T (eg. Such a model is also an initial model, 10 which for completeness we also de ne here:
An initial model J of F is a reachable model such that for any relation r de ned in F, ground instances r(t) are true in J i they are true in all models of F.
In general, the existence of an isoinitial model is of course not guaranteed. LIST is essentially the standard axiomatisation of lists (of integers).
nocc(a; L) gives the number of occurrences of a in L. elemi(L; i; a) means 11 We have also included the axiom schema of induction for reasoning purposes. It can be shown that an isoinitial model of LIST is an expansion of the isoinitial model of NAT , and is the usual structure (the term model generated by the constructors nil and ) of lists of integers.
With NAT and LIST we have completed the construction of SET (Int) . Note that, in the isoinitial model of SET , Set is (interpreted as) the set of nite sets of integers.
Note, however, that SET is di erent from NAT and LIST in that the constructor f g of SET does not satisfy the freeness axiom for f g, namely fXg = fY g ! X = Y . This just means that in SET sets are represented by lists whose elements may appear in any order and may contain duplicates.
Speci cations
In a given framework, we can add axioms for (total computable) functions and (decidable) relations in the manner we have just described. This mechanism allows us to de ne or specify new functions and relations. In LIST (Int), for instance, we can de ne the the usual functions for length and concatenation, and the usual`membership',`length',`concatenation', and`permutation' relations. This illustrates how the language of a framework can be expanded by new speci cations.
We shall use two kinds of speci cations: if-and-only-if speci cations and conditional speci cations. The former are used to de ne new relations and to expand the language of the framework F, whilst the latter are only used to specify di erent program behaviours and do not expand language of F.
An if-and-only-if speci cation S of a new relation r in F consists of a de nition of the form r(x) $ R(x) where R(x) is a formula of the language of F. 13 An if-and-only-if speci cation is therefore an explicit (non-recursive) definition. In the isoinitial model of F, the meaning of the new symbol is completely determined by the de nition, and we get a unique expanded model that interprets all the old symbols as before and the new one according to its de nition. In other words, a speci ed relation has a unique interpretation in the isoinitial model of F.
Thus explicit de nitions can be used to expand the speci cation language by new useful abbreviations, such as the aforementioned ones for LIST .
However, we must use only adequate de nitions, that is de nitions which give rise to expansions of the isoinitial model (of F) that are also isoinitial. 13 For completeness, an if-and-only-if speci cation of a new function f in F consists of a de nition of the form y = f (x) $ R(x; y) where R(x; y) is a formula of the language of F such that F`8x9!yR(x;y).
In this connection, a useful criterion for adequacy is the existence of a totally correct program for the speci ed relation ( 8] ). 14 The model-theoretic relation between an if-and-only-if speci cation S of a relation r and a program P to compute r is illustrated in Figure 2 . 
Since we represent sets by lists, and our programs will compute on lists, we specify sublist as follows:
sublist(X; Y ) $ fXg fY g (2) Note that (2) corresponds to S1 (and hence P1) of Section 2. From the point of view of actually specifying programs, if-and-only-if speci cations are often too restrictive and in exible, and we would prefer weaker forms of speci cations that admit multiple interpretations, corresponding to di erent program behaviours that are all correct for the problem at hand. To this end, we use conditional speci cations. For instance, we could specify the sublist relation as follows:
That is, we want sublist(X; Y ) to coincide with the post-condition OC (X)f Xg fY g, where OC is an output condition stating that X does not 14 This means that we can actually use program synthesis to enrich the speci cation language by adequate de nitions. 15 We use in x notation for convenience and clarity.
contain duplicates, only if Y satis es an input-or pre-condition IC stating that Y does not contain duplicates. Note that as is usual with pre-postcondition style speci cations, whenever the pre-condition IC does not hold, then the post-condition, in particular the output condition OC , need not be satis ed.
Thus, unlike an if-and-only-if speci cation, a relation de ned by a conditional speci cation C has many interpretations, 16 and we de ne correctness as follows:
A program P is a correct implementation of a conditional specication C of a relation r i the interpretation of r in the minimum Herbrand model H of P is (isomorphic to) one of the interpretations that satisfy C.
This is illustrated in Figure 3 .
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Figure 3: Model-theoretic relation between conditional speci cation C and P.
Thus a conditional speci cation may have di erent correct implementations. For example, one of the correct implementations of (3) is P2 in Section 2 (as we will show later), when the pre-and post-conditions in (3) correspond to those in S2.
Programs
Now we look at some examples of subset programs in SET , and establish their model-theoretic, or semantic correctness by comparing their minimum Herbrand models with (the meaning of sublist stated by) the isoinitial model of SET . We will consider both the if-and-only-if speci cation (2) and the conditional speci cation (3) of sublist.
To handle sets properly, we should either switch to a suitable constraint logic programming language, or impose restrictions on the use of sets in 16 Technically, there are many expansions of the isoinitial model of the framework. standard logic programs. 17 However, a discussion of these alternatives is outside the scope of this paper, and so here we will simply use standard logic programs that do not use sets. We will de ne logic programs and their minimum Herbrand models in the usual way, and use sets only in speci cations. Relations on sets will be linked to corresponding relations on lists via speci cations like (2) or (3) in the previous section.
In general, as stated by Figure 2 , for an if-and-only-if speci cation S of a relation r, in order to establish the correctness with respect to S of a program P (with minimum Herbrand model H) in a framework F (with isoinitial model I), we need to show that H is isomorphic to the restriction of I to the signature of P. For this purpose, we can make use of the following property: 18 In a framework F with isoinitial model I, if a program P with minimum Herbrand model H existentially terminates, 19 and we can prove its completion in F, then H is isomorphic to the restriction of I to the signature of P. since P1' existentially terminates and its completion can be proved in SET . 20 Now P1' of course corresponds to P1 in Section 2, and like P1, P1' produces redundant answers.
To avoid redundant answers, we need a better representation of sets than lists with duplicates. We will now show how we can use the conditional speci cation (3) to introduce input and output conditions that correspond to better list representations of sets. More importantly, we will explain in general how we can establish the semantic correctness of a program P with respect to a conditional speci cation C, i.e. how to compare the minimum Herbrand model of P with the many interpretations (in I) that satisfy C.
First, it is easy to see that a conditional speci cation can always be given as a pair of implications. In the case of (3), these are:
Since SET does not satisfy the freeness axioms.
18
For brevity, we omit the proof here.
19
That is, for every goal, P either terminates with success or nitely fails. (5) if it computes a relation that contains small and is contained in big. This is illustrated in Figure 4 . Therefore successful proofs in (a) and (b) will mean the semantic correctness of the implementation of P with respect to the chosen conditional specication. 21 Indeed, in this case, the clauses of P are theorems of SET f8(sublist(X;Y ) $ big(X; Y ))g.
22
A proof can be found in 12].
As an example, consider the speci cation (3) It is easy to see that our proof can be completed if select is such that select(x; Y; H) ! select big (x; Y; H) (6) can be proved in the framework. Now condition (a) only guarantees that the computed relation is contained in big. Indeed, many select relations satisfy (6) (8) can be proved, then so can (7) .
Therefore, if we choose a select that satis es both (6) and (8), then (a) and (b) hold and semantic correctness is guaranteed. For example, we can choose the following conditional speci cation:
Now we can prove that the clauses for select in P2 in Section 2 are a correct implementation of (9) .
The other programs in Section 2, viz. P3 and P4, can be speci ed by conditional speci cations using the following if-and-only-if speci cations of the ordering relation:
We can show their correctness in the way we have illustrated above. 4 Open Frameworks, Speci cations and Programs In this section, we brie y indicate how our model-theoretic approach also works if P and S (in a framework F) are open, i.e. if they contain parameters. 24 To this end, we will show that it is better to use isoinitial semantics for both frameworks and programs.
In an open framework or program, the open symbols, or parameters, may be sort or relation symbols. 25 In an open framework F, there may be assumptions for a parameter, i.e. properties that are required or assumed by F. For instance, an open sort symbol stands for a parametric domain, and we may assume that actual parameters can only be domains constructed by constant and function symbols that satisfy the freeness axioms. Equally an open relation symbol may have associated axioms, e.g. an open ordering relation may be required to be a total ordering. Unlike axioms that de ne symbols completely, parameter axioms only partially characterise the parameters, i.e. they de ne only properties of the parameters that F requires. Now an open program or an open framework has a class of models. We will rst explain how isoinitial semantics can capture the class of models of an open program P. As we pointed out in Section 3.1, an isoinitial model that is reachable is also an initial model. Now it should be obvious that a minimum Herbrand model is an initial model. Here we shall make use of these facts, and endow P with isoinitial semantics in such a way that, when an isoinitial model exists, then it is the minimum Herbrand model of P. This little departure from standard logic programming not only gives us semantic homogeneity, but, more importantly, it also allows us to reason about open programs. The freeness axioms for the constant and function symbols of the language (of the program), e.g. free(spider; elan; 0; 1; 2; : : :).
The complete diagram of any prede ned predicates, e.g. diag( ). This diagram contains both positive and negative information. where the parameter axioms for only state that is a total ordering relation. In this framework we can have open programs like P3 and P4 which assume a total ordering among list elements. In this situation, modeltheoretic correctness is de ned as before, but now Herbrand instances have to satisfy the total ordering axioms for the parameter , and open programs are closed by adding clauses for .
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that the proof techniques that we used in Section 3 to state model-theoretic correctness in closed framework can be extended to model-theoretic correctness in adequate open frameworks. To do so, we need only replace existential termination by parametric termination, which roughly speaking corresponds to termination of every instance of the program. For example, all the programs considered in this paper parametrically terminate, that is, they existentially terminate regardless of the domain of the elements and the total ordering on them.
Conclusion
We have examined the model-theoretic relationship between logic programs and speci cations, in the context of the underlying problem domain, or framework. The rôle of the framework is fundamental, since it provides the semantic underpinning for both speci cations and programs, and it marks the main di erence between our approach and the view that \logic programs are obviously correct since they are logical assertions". The latter is not quite satisfactory, since the meaning of correctness must be de ned in terms of something other than logic programs themselves (see e.g. 4, p. 410]).
We have shown that in a framework, we can de ne correctness in a semantic way, either informally or formally. Informal correctness allows us to distinguish programs (as executable speci cations) from their (informal) intended meanings. Formal correctness involves full rst-order logical theories, and is de ned in terms of model theory. In either case, we have shown that the relation between speci cations and programs is always well-de ned, and we can properly distinguish between them on the basis of the correctness relation.
A particular strength of our model-theoretic approach to correctness is its ability to handle open speci cations and programs. In general we can use our approach to specify what are called generic classes in object-oriented programming, and de ne correctness of open methods with respect to to their speci cations when they are inherited (see 10]). This kind of correctness, which we call steadfastness ( 12] ), that is preserved through inheritance hierarchies seems to be a promising tool for formal object-oriented software engineering.
Our semantics for open programs, their correctness, and the correctness of their composition is also di erent from other model-theoretic approaches such as 3, 2]. Again, the main di erence lies in our use of a framework that allows us to reason about the correctness of program composition. This enables us to de ne steadfastness, which is the basis of formal correctness of object-oriented programs.
